EDITORIAL: Open Letter to Paytend Europe UAB – Stop Facilitating the Illegal MEXC Scheme and Complicity in IP Theft!

By the FinTelegram Editorial Board Date: February 18, 2026

Executive Summary: The Silence is Deafening

Last Friday, FinTelegram sent a formal Urgent Notification to the compliance department and board of Paytend Europe UAB, a Lithuanian Electronic Money Institution (EMI). We alerted them to their role in facilitating the illegal operations of the crypto exchange MEXC scheme and demanded an explanation for why their payment rails remain open to a platform that systematically hijacks our intellectual property.

We gave Paytend 48 hours to respond. They chose silence.

As of this morning, February 18, 2026, our forensic tests confirm that Paytend continues to process Euro deposits for MEXC via the Romanian shell company Finetix Ltd S.R.L. Furthermore, similarweb traffic analysis reveals a damning truth: MEXC.com and MEXC.co are among the top 5 referring websites for Paytend.com. This is not a compliance oversight; it is a business model.

Consequently, we are escalating this matter by publishing our notification as an Open Letter. We are doing this with the full knowledge that MEXC’s automated scraping bots will likely steal this article and republish it on their own “News” section—an irony that perfectly encapsulates the lawlessness of their operation.

The “Red Shield” Rail: How Paytend Powers MEXC

For regulators and compliance officers reading this, here is the exact mechanism Paytend uses to launder high-risk crypto flows into the European banking system:

1. The Front (Finetix): Users on MEXC are forced to accept the Terms & Conditions of Finetix Limited S.R.L., a Romanian entity with no known VASP license and a non-functional website.
2. The Pipe (Paytend): Finetix holds its banking accounts with Paytend Europe UAB (Lithuania). When a user sends Euros to “buy crypto” on MEXC, they are actually wiring funds to Finetix’s Paytend account.
3. The Reality: Finetix acts as a mere pass-through vehicle. It provides no independent service. Its sole purpose is to mask the ultimate beneficiary—the blacklisted exchange MEXC—from the scrutiny of the sending banks.

The Evidence of Complicity: Data from Similarweb shows a massive, sustained flow of user traffic directly from MEXC’s domains to Paytend’s portal. It is statistically impossible for Paytend’s risk team to be unaware that one of their largest traffic sources is an unlicensed offshore exchange warning-listed by regulators globally.

OPEN LETTER TO PAYTEND EUROPE UAB

To: The Board of Directors & Compliance Department, Paytend Europe UAB From: FinTelegram News & The RatEx42 Investigation Team Subject: IMMEDIATE CEASE AND DESIST – Facilitation of Illegal Services & IP Theft

Dear Paytend Management,

You have ignored our private notice, so we are now making our demand public.

1. Facilitation of Unauthorized Financial Services Your client, Finetix Limited S.R.L. (Romania), is operating as an unlicensed crypto-asset service provider (CASP) on behalf of MEXC Global. By providing banking rails (IBANs) to Finetix, Paytend Europe UAB is knowingly processing funds for an illegal exchange that solicits EU consumers without a MiCA license. This is a direct violation of your AML/CTF obligations under the Bank of Lithuania’s guidelines.

2. Complicity in Intellectual Property Theft MEXC Global systematically scrapes, copies, and republishes FinTelegram’s proprietary content—including our warning lists and investigative reports—on its own website to artificially boost its SEO and create a veneer of legitimacy. By maintaining the financial lifeline for MEXC, Paytend is profiting from an entity that is actively stealing our Intellectual Property. We hold you contributory liable for these damages.

3. The “Finetix” Sham We have evidence that Finetix is a shell entity. Its website is dysfunctional for crypto purchases, yet it processes millions in EUR for MEXC. You are banking a “Ghost.”

Our Demand: We require Paytend Europe UAB to immediately terminate its banking relationship with Finetix Limited S.R.L. and cease all indirect processing for MEXC. Continued failure to act will result in FinTelegram submitting a formal complaint to the Bank of Lithuania (Lietuvos bankas) and the Romanian Financial Intelligence Unit, detailing your willful blindness to high-risk flows.

Govern yourselves accordingly.

A Note to MEXC (and their Bots)

To the automated scrapers at MEXC who will likely hijack this article and post it on mexc.com/news: Thank you for distributing the evidence of your own illegality. You are proving our point better than we ever could.

Call to Action

• Whistleblowers: Are you an employee at Paytend or Finetix? Do you have internal emails regarding the “High Risk” classification of the MEXC account?
• Regulators: We call upon the Bank of Lithuania to audit the transaction volumes between Paytend and Romanian shell companies. The data does not lie.

Submit information anonymously at Whistle42.com.